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Abstract. We address the problem of verifying k-safety properties: properties
that refer to k interacting executions of a program. A prominent way to verify k-
safety properties is by self composition. In this approach, the problem of checking
k-safety over the original program is reduced to checking an “ordinary” safety
property over a program that executes k copies of the original program in some
order. The way in which the copies are composed determines how complicated it
is to verify the composed program. We view this composition as provided by a
semantic self composition function that maps each state of the composed program
to the copies that make a move. Since the “quality” of a self composition func-
tion is measured by the ability to verify the safety of the composed program, we
formulate the problem of inferring a self composition function together with the
inductive invariant needed to verify safety of the composed program, where both
are restricted to a given language. We develop a property-directed inference algo-
rithm that, given a set of predicates, infers composition-invariant pairs expressed
by Boolean combinations of the given predicates, or determines that no such pair
exists. We implemented our algorithm and demonstrate that it is able to find self
compositions that are beyond reach of existing tools.
1 Introduction
Many relational properties, such as noninterference [12], determinism [21], service
level agreements [9], and more, can be reduced to the problem of k-safety. Namely,
reasoning about k different traces of a program simultaneously. A common approach
to verifying k-safety properties is by means of self composition, where the program
is composed with k copies of itself [4,31]. A state of the composed program consists
of the states of each copy, and a trace naturally corresponds to k traces of the original
program. Therefore, k-safety properties of the original program become ordinary safety
properties of the composition, hence reducing k-safety verification to ordinary safety.
This enables reasoning about k-safety properties using any of the existing techniques
for safety verification such as Hoare logic [20] or model checking [7].
While self composition is sound and complete for k-safety, its applicability is ques-
tionable for two main reasons: (i) considering several copies of the program greatly in-
creases the state space; and (ii) the way in which the different copies are composed when
reducing the problem to safety verification affects the complexity of the resulting self
composed program, and as such affects the complexity of verifying it. Improving the
applicability of self composition has been the topic of many works [2,29,14,18,26,32].
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However, most efforts are focused on compositions that are pre-defined, or only depend
on syntactic similarities.
In this paper, we take a different approach; we build upon the observation that by
choosing the “right” composition, the verification can be greatly simplified by leverag-
ing “simple” correlations between the executions. To that end, we propose an algorithm,
called PDSC, for inferring a property directed self composition. Our approach uses a
dynamic composition, where the composition of the different copies can change during
verification, directed at simplifying the verification of the composed program.
Compositions considered in previous work differ in the order in which the copies
of the program execute: either synchronously, asynchronously, or in some mix of the
two [33,3,14]. To allow general compositions, we define a composition function that
maps every state of the composed program to the set of copies that are scheduled in
the next step. This determines the order of execution for the different copies, and thus
induces the self composed program. Unlike most previous works where the composition
is pre-defined based on syntactic rules only, our composition is semantic as it is defined
over the state of the composed program.
To capture the difficulty of verifying the composed program, we consider verifi-
cation by means of inferring an inductive invariant, parameterized by a language for
expressing the inductive invariant. Intuitively, the more expressive the language needs
to be, the more difficult the verification task is. We then define the problem of inferring
a composition function together with an inductive invariant for verifying the safety of
the composed program, where both are restricted to a given language. Note that for a
fixed language L, an inductive invariant may exist for some composition function but
not for another 4 . Thus, the restriction to L defines a target for the inference algorithm,
which is now directed at finding a composition that admits an inductive invariant in L.
Example 1. To demonstrate our approach, consider the program in Figure 1. The pro-
gram inserts a new value into an array. We assume that the array A and its length len
are “low”-security variables, while the inserted value h is “high”-security. The first loop
finds the location in which hwill be inserted. Note that the number of iterations depends
on the value of h. Due to that, the second loop executes to ensure that the output i (which
corresponds to the number of iterations) does not leak sensitive data. As an example, we
emphasize that without the second loop, i could leak the location of h in A. To express
the property that i does not leak sensitive data, we use the 2-safety property that in any
two executions, if the inputs A and len are the same, so is the output i.
To verify the 2-safety property, consider two copies of the program. Let the language
L for verifying the self composition be defined by the predicates depicted in Figure 1.
The most natural self composition to consider is a lock-step composition, where the
copies execute synchronously. However, for such a composition the composed program
may reach a state where, for example, i1 = i2+1. This occurs when the first copy exists
the first loop, while the second copy is still executing it. Since the language cannot
express this correlation between the two copies, no inductive invariant suffices to verify
that i1 = i2 when the program terminates.
4 See Appendix B for an example that requires a non-linear inductive invariant with a composi-
tion that is based on the control structure but has a linear invariant with another.
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int arrayInsert(int[] A, int len, int h) {
int i=0;
1: while (i < len && A[i] < h)
i++;
2: len = shift_array(A, i, 1);
A[i] = h;
3: while (i < len)
i++;
4: return i;
}
predicates: i1 = i2, i1 < len1, i2 < len2,
A1[i1] < h1, A2[i2] < h2, len1 = len2,
len1 = len2 + 1, len2 = len1 + 1
composition:
if(pc1 < 3 && (pc2 > 0 || !cond1)
&& (pc2 == 3||(pc2 == 0 && cond2)))
step(1);
else if (pc2 < 3 && (pc1 > 0 || !cond2)
&& (pc1 == 3 || (pc1 == 0 && cond1)))
step(2);
else step(1,2);
cond1 := i1 < len1 && A1[i1] < h1
cond2 := i2 < len2 && A2[i2] < h2
Fig. 1: Constant-time insert to an array.
In contrast, when verifying the 2-safety property, PDSC directs its search towards a
composition function for which an inductive invariant in L does exist. As such, it infers
the composition function depicted in Figure 1, as well as an inductive invariant in L.
The invariant for this composition implies that i1 = i2 at every state.
As demonstrated by the example, PDSC focuses on logical languages based on pred-
icate abstraction [17], where inductive invariants can be inferred by model checking. In
order to infer a composition function that admits an inductive invariant inL, PDSC starts
from a default composition function, and modifies its definition based on the reasoning
performed by the model checker during verification. As the composition function is
part of the verified model (recall that it is defined over the program state), different
compositions are part of the state space explored by the model checker. As a result, a
key ingredient of PDSC is identifying “bad” compositions that prevent it from finding
an inductive invariant in L. It is important to note that a naive algorithm that tries all
possible composition functions has a time complexity O(22
|P|
), where P is the set of
predicates considered. However, integrating the search for a composition function into
the model checking algorithm allows us to reduce the time complexity of the algorithm
to 2O(|P|), where we show that the problem is in fact PSPACE-hard.
We implemented PDSC using SEAHORN [19], Z3 [25] and SPACER [22] and eval-
uated it on examples that demonstrate the need for nontrivial semantic compositions.
Our results clearly show that PDSC can solve complex examples by inferring the re-
quired composition, while other tools cannot verify these examples. We emphasize that
for these particular examples, lock-step composition is not sufficient. We also evaluated
PDSC on the examples from [29,26] that are proven with the trivial lock-step composi-
tion. On these examples, PDSC is comparable to state of the art tools.
Related work. This paper addresses the problem of verifying k-safety properties (also
called hyperproperties [8]) by means of self composition. Other approaches tackle the
problem without self-composition, and often focus on more specific properties, most
noticeably the 2-safety noninterference property (e.g. [1,32]). Below we focus on works
that use self-composition.
Previous work such as [4,2,3,15,31,14] considered self composition (also called
product programs) where the composition function is constant and set a-priori, using
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syntax-based hints. While useful in general, such self compositions may sometimes
result in programs that are too complex to verify. This is in contrast to our approach,
where the composition function is evolving during verification, and is adapted to the
capabilities of the model checker.
The work most closely related to ours is [29] which introduces Cartesian Hoare
Logic (CHL) for verification of k-safety properties, and designs a verification frame-
work for this logic. This work is further improved in [26]. These works search for a
proof in CHL, and in doing so, implicitly modify the composition. Our work infers the
composition explicitly and can use off-the-shelf model checking tools. More impor-
tantly, when loops are involved both [29] and [26] use lock-step composition and align
loops syntactically. Our algorithm, in contrast, does not rely on syntactic similarities,
and can handle loops that cannot be aligned trivially.
There have been several results in the context of harnessing Constraint Horn Clauses
(CHC) solvers for verification of relational properties [11,24]. Given several copies of
a CHC system, a product CHC system that synchronizes the different copies is created
by a syntactical analysis of the rules in the CHC system. These works restrict the syn-
chronization points to CHC predicates (i.e., program locations), and consider only one
synchronization (obtained via transformations of the system of CHCs). On the other
hand, our algorithm iteratively searches for a good synchronization (composition), and
considers synchronizations that depend on program state.
Equivalence checking and regression verification. Equivalence checking is another
closely related research field, where a composition of several programs is considered.
As an example, equivalence checking is applied to verify the correctness of compiler
optimizations [33,28,10,18]. In [28] the composition is determined by a brute-force
search for possible synchronization points. While this brute-force search resembles our
approach for finding the correct composition, it is not guided by the verification pro-
cess. The works in [10,18] identify possible synchronization points syntactically, and
try to match them during the construction of a simulation relation between programs.
Regression verification also requires the ability to show equivalence between differ-
ent versions of a program [15,16,30]. The problem of synchronizing unbalanced loops
appears in [30] in the form of unbalanced recursive function calls. To allow synchro-
nization in such cases, the user can specify different unrolling parameters for the dif-
ferent copies. In contrast, our approach relies only on user supplied predicates that are
needed to establish correctness, while synchronization is handled automatically.
2 Preliminaries
In this paper we reason about programs by means of the transition systems defining
their semantics. A transition system is a tuple T = (S,R, F ), where S is a set of states,
R ⊆ S×S is a transition relation that specifies the steps in an execution of the program,
and F ⊆ S is a set of terminal states F ⊆ S such that every terminal state s ∈ F has
an outgoing transition to itself and no additional transitions (terminal states allow us to
reason about pre/post specifications of programs). An execution or trace pi = s0, s1, . . .
is a (finite or infinite) sequence of states such that for every i ≥ 0, (si, si+1) ∈ R. The
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execution is terminating if there exists 0 ≤ i ≤ |pi| such that si ∈ F . In this case, the
suffix of the execution is of the form si, si, . . . and we say that pi ends at si.
As usual, we represent transition systems using logical formulas over a set of vari-
ables, corresponding to the program variables. We denote the set of variables by V . The
set of terminal states is represented by a formula over V and the transition relation is
represented by a formula over V unionmulti V ′, where V represents the pre-state of a transition
and V ′ = {v′ | v ∈ V} represents its post-state. In the sequel, we use sets of states and
their symbolic representation via formulas interchangeably.
Safety and inductive invariants. We consider safety properties defined via pre/post con-
ditions.5 A safety property is a pair (pre, post) where pre, post are formulas over V ,
representing subsets of S, denoting the pre- and post-condition, respectively. T satisfies
(pre, post), denoted T |= (pre, post), if every terminating execution pi of T that starts
in a state s0 such that s0 |= pre ends in a state s such that s |= post. In other words, for
every state s that is reachable in T from a state in pre we have that s |= F → post.
A prominent way to verify safety properties is by finding an inductive invariant.
An inductive invariant for a transition system T and a safety property (pre, post) is a
formula Inv such that (1) pre ⇒ Inv (initiation), (2) Inv ∧ R ⇒ Inv ′ (consecution),
and (3) Inv ⇒ (F → post) (safety), where ϕ ⇒ ψ denotes the validity of ϕ → ψ,
and ϕ′ denotes ϕ(V ′), i.e., the formula obtained after substituting every v ∈ V by the
corresponding v′ ∈ V . If there exists such an inductive invariant, then T |= (pre, post).
k-safety. A k-safety property refers to k interacting executions of T . Similarly to an
ordinary property, it is defined by (pre, post), except that pre and post are defined over
V1 unionmulti . . . unionmulti Vk where Vi = {vi | v ∈ V} denotes the ith copy of the program variables.
As such, pre and post represent sets of k-tuples of program states (k-states for short):
for a k-tuple (s1, . . . , sk) of states and a formula ϕ over V1 unionmulti . . . unionmulti Vk, we say that
(s1, . . . , sk) |= ϕ if ϕ is satisfied when for each i, the assignment of Vi is determined
by si. We say that T satisfies (pre, post), denoted T |=k (pre, post), if for every k
terminating executions pi1, . . . , pik of T that start in states s1, . . . , sk, respectively, such
that (s1, . . . , sk) |= pre, it holds that they end in states t1, . . . , tk, respectively, such
that (t1, . . . , tk) |= post.
For example, the non interference property may be specified by the following 2-
safety property:
pre =
∧
v∈LowIn
v1 = v2 post =
∧
v∈LowOut
v1 = v2
where LowIn and LowOut denote subsets of the program inputs, resp. outputs, that are
considered “low security” and the rest are classified as “high security”. This property
asserts that every 2 terminating executions that start in states that agree on the “low se-
curity” inputs end in states that agree on the low security outputs, i.e., the outcome does
not depend on any “high security” input and, hence, does not leak secure information.
5 Our results can be extended to arbitrary safety (and k-safety) properties by introducing “ob-
servable” states to which the property may refer.
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Checking k-safety properties reduces to checking ordinary safety properties by cre-
ating a self composed program that consists of k copies of the transition system, each
with its own copy of the variables, that run in parallel in some way. Thus, the self com-
posed program is defined over variables V‖k = V1 unionmulti . . . unionmulti Vk, where Vi = {vi |
v ∈ V} denotes the variables associated with the ith copy. For example, a common
composition is a lock-step composition in which the copies execute simultaneously.
The resulting composed transition system T ‖k = (S‖k, R‖k, F ‖k) is defined such that
S‖k = S× . . .×S, F ‖k = ∧ki=1 F (Vi) and R‖k = ∧ki=1R(Vj ,Vj ′). Note that R‖k is
defined over V‖kunionmultiV‖k′ (as usual). Then, the k-safety property (pre, post) is satisfied by
T if and only if an ordinary safety property (pre, post) is satisfied by T ‖k. More general
notions of self composition are investigated in Section 3.
3 Inferring Self Compositions for Restricted Languages of
Inductive Invariants
Any self-composition is sufficient for reducing k-safety to safety, e.g., lock-step, se-
quential, synchronous, asynchronous, etc. However, the choice of the self-composition
used determines the difficulty of the resulting safety problem. Different self composed
programs would require different inductive invariants, some of which cannot be ex-
pressed in a given logical language.
In this section, we formulate the problem of inferring a self composition function
such that the obtained self composed program may be verified with a given language of
inductive invariants. We are, therefore, interested in inferring both the self composition
function and the inductive invariant for verifying the resulting self composed program.
We start by formulating the kind of self compositions that we consider.
In the sequel, we fix a transition system T = (S,R, F ) with a set of variables V .
3.1 Semantic Self Composition
Roughly speaking, a k self composition of T consists of k copies of T that execute
together in some order, where steps may interleave or be performed simultaneously.
The order is determined by a self composition function, which may also be viewed as
a scheduler that is responsible for scheduling a subset of the copies in each step. We
consider semantic compositions in which the order may depend on the states of the
different copies, as well as the correlations between them (as opposed to syntactic com-
positions that only depend on the control locations of the copies, but may not depend
on the values of other variables):
Definition 1 (Semantic Self Composition Function). A semantic k self composition
function (k-composition function for short) is a function f : Sk → P({1..k}), mapping
each k-state to a nonempty set of copies that are to participate in the next step of the
self composed program6.
6 We consider memoryless composition functions. Compositions that depend on the history of
the (joint) execution are supported via ghost state added to the program to track the history.
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We represent a k-composition function f by a set of logical conditions, with a
condition CM for every nonempty subset M ⊆ {1..k} of the copies. For each such
M ⊆ {1..k}, the condition CM is defined over V‖k = V1 unionmulti . . . unionmulti Vk, and hence it
represents a set of k-states, with the meaning that all the k-states that satisfy CM are
mapped to M by f :
f(s1, . . . , sk) =M if and only if (s1, . . . , sk) |= CM .
To ensure that the function is well defined, we require that (
∨
M CM ) ≡ true, which
ensures that every k-state satisfies at least one of the conditions. We also require that
for every M1 6= M2, CM1 ∧ CM2 ≡ false, hence every k-state satisfies at most one
condition. Together these requirements ensure that the conditions induce a partition of
the set of all k-states. In the sequel, we identify a k-composition function f with its
symbolic representation via conditions {CM}M and use them interchangeably.
Definition 2 (Composed Program). Given a k-composition function f , represented
via conditionsCM for every nonempty setM ⊆ {1..k}, we define the k self composition
of T to be the transition system T f = (S‖k, Rf , F ‖k) over variables V‖k = V1 unionmulti . . .unionmulti
Vk defined as follows: F ‖k = ∧ki=1 F i, where F i = F (Vi), and
Rf =
∨
∅6=M⊆{1..k}
(CM ∧ ϕM ) where ϕM =
∧
j∈M
R(Vj ,Vj ′) ∧
∧
j 6∈M
Vj = Vj ′
Thus, in T f , the set of states consists of k-states (S‖k = S×. . .×S), the terminal states
are k-states in which all the individual states are terminal, and the transition relation
includes a transition from (s1, . . . , sk) to (s′1, . . . , s
′
k) if and only if f(s1, . . . , sk) =M
and
(∀i ∈M. (si, s′i) ∈ R) ∧ (∀i 6∈M. si = s′i)
That is, every transition of T f corresponds to a simultaneous transition of a subset M
of the k copies of T , where the subset is determined by the self composition function f .
If f(s1, . . . , sk) =M , then for every i ∈M we say that i is scheduled in (s1, . . . , sk).
Example 2. A k self composition that runs the k copies of T sequentially, one after the
other, corresponds to a k-composition function f defined by f(s1, . . . , sk) = {i}where
i ∈ {1..k} is the minimal index of a non-terminal state in {s1, . . . , sk}. If all states in
{s1, . . . , sk} are terminal then i = k (or any other index). This is encoded as follows:
for every 1 ≤ i < k, C{i} = ¬F i ∧
∧
j<i F
j , C{k} =
∧
j<k F
j and CM = false for
every other M ⊆ {1..k}.
Example 3. The lock-step composition that runs the k copies of T synchronously cor-
responds to a k-self composition function f defined by f(s1, . . . , sk) = {1, . . . , k},
and encoded by C{1,...,k} = true and CM = false for every other M ⊆ {1..k}.
In order to ensure soundness of a reduction of k-safety to safety via self composi-
tion, one has to require that the self composition function does not “starve” any copy
of the transition system that is about to terminate if it continues to execute. We refer to
this requirement as fairness.
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Definition 3 (Fairness). A k-self composition function f is fair if for every k terminat-
ing executions pi1, . . . , pik of T there exists an execution pi‖ of T f such that for every
copy i ∈ {1..k}, the projection of pi‖ to i is pii.
Note that by the definition of the terminal states of T f , pi‖ as above is guaranteed
to be terminating. We say that the ith copy terminates in pi‖ if pi‖ contains a k-state
(s1, . . . , sk) such that si ∈ F . Fairness may be enforced in a straightforward way by
requiring that whenever f(s1, . . . , sk) = M , the set M includes no index i for which
si ∈ F , unless all have terminated. Since we assume that terminal states may only
transition to themselves, a weaker requirement that suffices to ensure fairness is that M
includes at least one index i for which si 6∈ F , unless there is no such index.
The following claim is now straightforward:
Lemma 1. Let T be a transition system, (pre, post) a k-safety property, and f a fair
k-composition function for T and (pre, post). Then
T |=k (pre, post) iff T f |= (pre, post).
Proof (sketch). Every terminating execution of T f corresponds to k terminating execu-
tions of T . Fairness of f ensures that the converse also holds.
To demonstrate the necessity of the fairness requirement, consider a (non-fair) self
composition function f that maps every state to {1}. Then, regardless of what the actual
transition system T does, the resulting self composition T f satisfies every pre-post
specification vacuously, as it never reaches a terminal state.
Remark 1. While we require the conditions {CM}M defining a self composition func-
tion f to induce a partition of S‖k in order to ensure that f is well defined as a (total)
function, the requirement may be relaxed in two ways. First, we may allow CM1 and
CM2 to overlap. This will add more transitions and may make the task of verifying
the composed program more difficult, but it maintains the soundness of the reduction.
Second, it suffices that the conditions cover the set of reachable states of the composed
program rather than the entire state space. These relaxations do not damage soundness.
Technically, this means that f represented by the conditions is a relation rather than a
function. We still refer to it as a function and write f(s1, . . . , sk) = M to indicate that
(s1, . . . , sk) |= CM , not excluding the possibility that (s1, . . . , sk) |=M ′ for M ′ 6=M
as well. We note that as long as the language used to describe compositions is closed un-
der Boolean operations, we can always extract from the conditions {CM}M a function
f ′. This is done as follows:
– To prevent the overlap between conditions, determine an arbitrary total order < on
the sets M ⊆ {1..k} and set C ′M := CM ∧
∧
N<M ¬CN .
– To ensure that the conditions cover the entire state space, set C ′{1..k} := C
′
{1..k} ∨
¬(∨M CM ).
It is easy to verify that f ′ defined by {C ′M}M is a total self composition function and
that if f is fair, then so is f ′.
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3.2 The Problem of Inferring Self Composition with Inductive Invariant
Lemma 1 states the soundness of the reduction of k-safety to ordinary safety. Together
with the ability to verify safety by means of an inductive invariant, this leads to a verifi-
cation procedure. However, while soundness of the reduction holds for any self compo-
sition, an inductive invariant in a given language may exist for the composed program
resulting from some compositions but not from others. We therefore consider the self
composition function and the inductive invariant together, as a pair, leading to the fol-
lowing definition.
Definition 4. Let T be a transition system and (pre, post) a k safety property. For a
formula Inv over V‖k and a self composition function f represented by conditions
{CM}M , we say that (f, Inv) is a composition-invariant pair for T and (pre, post) if
the following conditions hold:
– pre⇒ Inv (initiation of Inv ),
– for every ∅ 6=M ⊆ {1..k}, Inv ∧CM ∧ ϕM ⇒ Inv ′ (consecution of Inv for Rf ),
– Inv ⇒ ((∧kj=1 F j)→ post) (safety of Inv ),
– Inv ⇒ ∨M CM (f covers the reachable states),
– for every ∅ 6=M ⊆ {1..k}, CM ∧ (
∨k
j=1 ¬F j)⇒
∨
j∈M ¬F j (f is fair).
As commented in Remark 1, we relax the requirement that (
∨
M CM ) ≡ true to
Inv ⇒ ∨M CM , thus ensuring that the conditions cover all the reachable states. Since
the reachable states of T f are determined by {CM}M (which define f ), this reveals
the interplay between the self composition function and the inductive invariant. Fur-
thermore, we do not require that CM1 ∧ CM2 ≡ false for M1 6= M2, hence a k-state
may satisfy multiple conditions. As explained earlier, these relaxations do not dam-
age soundness. Furthermore, if we construct from f a self composition function f ′ as
described in Remark 1, Inv would be an inductive invariant for T f
′
as well.
Lemma 2. If there exists a composition-invariant pair (f, Inv) for T and (pre, post),
then T |=k (pre, post).
Proof (sketch). If (f, Inv) is a composition-invariant pair, then Inv is an inductive in-
variant for T f
′
, where f ′ is a fair composition function defined as in Remark 1. From
Lemma 1 we conclude that T |=k (pre, post).
If we do not restrict the language in which f and Inv are specified, then the converse
also holds. However, in the sequel we are interested in the ability to verify k-safety with
a given language, e.g., one for which the conditions of Definition 4 belong to a decidable
fragment of logic and hence can be discharged automatically.
Definition 5 (Inference in L). Let L be a logical language. The problem of inferring a
composition-invariant pair in L is defined as follows. The input is a transition system T
and a k-safety property (pre, post). The output is a composition-invariant pair (f, Inv)
for T and (pre, post) (as defined in Definition 4), where Inv ∈ L and f is represented
by conditions {CM}M such that CM ∈ L for every ∅ 6= M ⊆ {1..k}. If no such pair
exists, the output is “no solution”.
9
When no solution exists, it does not necessarily mean that T 6|=k (pre, post). Instead,
it may be that the language L is simply not expressive enough. Unfortunately, for ex-
pressive languages (e.g., quantified formulas or even quantifier free linear integer arith-
metic), the problem of inferring an inductive invariant alone is already undecidable,
making the problem of inferring a composition-invariant pair undecidable as well:
Lemma 3. Let L be closed under Boolean operations and under substitution of a vari-
able with a value, and include equalities of the form v = a, where v is a variable and
a is a value (of the same sort). If the problem of inferring an inductive invariant in L is
undecidable, then so is the problem of inferring a composition-invariant pair in L.
Proof. We show a reduction from the ordinary invariant inference problem in L to the
problem of inferring a composition-invariant pair in L. Given a transition system T
and an ordinary safety property (pre, post) the reduction constructs a transition system
T ∗ = (S∗, R∗, F ∗) over V∗ = V unionmulti {b}, where b is a new Boolean variable such that
when b = true the original transitions are taken and when b = false the systems remains
in the same state, which is also added to the set of terminal states. Formally, for every
v ∈ V , let av be an arbitrary fixed value in the domain of v. For example, if v is Boolean,
av = false. The reduction constructs
R∗ = (b ∧R ∧ b′) ∨ (¬b ∧ (
∧
v∈V
v′ = av) ∧ ¬b′) F ∗ = F ∨ (¬b ∧
∧
v∈V
v′ = av),
and the following 2-safety property:
pre∗ =
(
b1 ∧ pre(V1) ∧ ¬b2 ∧
∧
v∈V
v2 = av
)
post∗ =
(
b1 ∧ post(V1) ∧ ¬b2 ∧
∧
v∈V
v2 = av
)
.
That is, the first copy is “initialized” with b = true and with the original pre-condition
and is required to terminate in a state that satisfies the original post-condition, while the
second copy is initialized with b = false, and with the value av for each original vari-
able, and is required to terminate in the same state. Clearly, if T has an inductive invari-
ant Inv for (pre, post), then (f, b1 ∧ Inv(V1)∧¬b2 ∧∧v∈V v2 = av) is a composition-
invariant pair for T ∗ and (pre∗, post∗), where f is defined by C{1,2} = true and
CM = false for any otherM , which is clearly in L. For the converse direction, if T ∗ has
a composition-invariant pair (f, Inv∗) for (pre∗, post∗) then Inv obtained by substitut-
ing each positive occurrence of b2 in Inv∗ by false, each negative occurrence of b2 by
true and each occurrence of v2 by av is an inductive invariant for T and (pre, post). uunionsq
For example, linear integer arithmetic satisfies the conditions of the lemma. This moti-
vates us to restrict the languages of inductive invariants. Specifically, we consider lan-
guages defined by a finite set of predicates. We consider relational predicates, defined
over V‖k = V1 unionmulti . . . unionmulti Vk. For a finite set of predicates P , we define LP to be the set
of all formulas obtained by Boolean combinations of the predicates in P .
Definition 6 (Inference using predicate abstraction). The problem of inferring a predicate-
based composition-invariant pair is defined as follows. The input is a transition system
T , a k-safety property (pre, post), and a finite set of predicates P . The output is the
solution to the problem of inferring a composition-invariant pair for T and (pre, post)
in LP .
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1 f ← lockstep , E ← ∅, Unreach← false
2 while (true) do
3 (res, Inv , cex )← Abs_Reach(P, T f , pre, post,Unreach)
4 if res = safe then return (f, Inv(P))
5 (sˆ,M)← Last_Step(cex )
6 E ← E ∪ {(sˆ,M)}
7 while (All_Excluded_Or_Starving(sˆ, E)) do
8 Unreach← Unreach ∨ sˆ
9 if Unreach ∧ ϕpre(B) 6≡ false then return “no solution in LP”
10 cex ← Remove_Last_Step(cex )
11 (sˆ,M)← Last_Step(cex )
12 E ← E ∪ {(sˆ,M)}
13 f ← Modify_SC(f, sˆ, E)
Algorithm 1: PDSC: Property-Directed Self-Composition.
Remark 2. It is possible to decouple the language used for expressing the self com-
position function from the language used to express the inductive invariant. Clearly,
different sets of predicates (and hence languages) can be assigned to the self compo-
sition function and to the inductive invariant. However, since inductiveness is defined
with respect to the transitions of the composed system, which are in turn defined by the
self composition function, if the language defining f is not included in the language
defining Inv , the conditions CM themselves would be over-approximated when check-
ing the requirements of Definition 4 and therefore would incur a precision loss. For this
reason, we use the same language for both.
Since the problem of invariant inference in LP is PSPACE-hard [23], a reduc-
tion from the problem of inferring inductive invariants to the problem of inferring
composition-invariant pairs (similar to the one used in the proof of Lemma 3) shows
that composition-invariant inference in LP is also PSPACE-hard:
Theorem 1. Inferring a predicate-based composition-invariant pair is PSPACE-hard.
4 Algorithm for Inferring Composition-Invariant Pairs
In this section, we present Property Directed Self-Composition, PDSC for short — our
algorithm for tackling the composition-invariant inference problem for languages of
predicates (Definition 6). Namely, given a transition system T , a k-safety property
(pre, post) and a finite set of predicates P , we address the problem of finding a pair
(f, Inv ), where f is a self composition function and Inv is an inductive invariant for
the composed transition system T f obtained from f , and both of them are in LP , i.e.,
defined by Boolean combinations of the predicates in P .
We rely on the property that a transition system (in our case T f ) has an inductive
invariant in LP if and only if its abstraction obtained using P is safe. This is because,
the set of reachable abstract states is the strongest set expressible inLP that satisfies ini-
tiation and consecution. Given T f , this allows us to use predicate abstraction to either
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obtain an inductive invariant in LP for T f (if the abstraction of T f is safe) or determine
that no such inductive invariant exists (if an abstract counterexample trace is obtained).
The latter indicates that a different self composition function needs to be considered. A
naive realization of this idea gives rise to an iterative algorithm that starts from an ar-
bitrary initial composition function and in each iteration computes a new composition
function. At the worst case such an algorithm enumerates all self composition func-
tions defined in LP , i.e., has time complexity O(22|P|). Importantly, we observe that,
when no inductive invariant exists for some composition function, we can use the ab-
stract counterexample trace returned in this case to (i) generalize and eliminate multiple
composition functions, and (ii) identify that some abstract states must be unreachable if
there is to be a composition-invariant pair, i.e., we “block” states in the spirit of property
directed reachability [5,13]. This leads to the algorithm depicted in Algorithm 1 whose
worst case time complexity is 2O(|P|). Next, we explain the algorithm in detail.
Finding an inductive invariant for a given composition function using predicate
abstraction. We use predicate abstraction [17,27] to check if a given candidate com-
position function has a corresponding inductive invariant. This is done as follows. The
abstraction of T f using P , denoted AP(T f ), is a transition system (Sˆ, Rˆ) defined over
variables B, where B = {bp | p ∈ P} (we omit the terminal states). Sˆ = {0, 1}B, i.e.,
each abstract state corresponds to a valuation of the Boolean variables representing P .
An abstract state sˆ ∈ Sˆ represents the following set of states of T f :
γ(sˆ) = {s‖ ∈ S‖k | ∀p ∈ P. s‖ |= p⇔ sˆ(bp) = 1}
We extend γ to sets of states and to formulas representing sets of states in the usual
way. The abstract transition relation is defined as usual:
Rˆ = {(sˆ1, sˆ2) | ∃s‖1 ∈ γ(sˆ1) ∃s‖2 ∈ γ(sˆ2). (s‖1, s‖2) ∈ Rf}
Note that the set of abstract states in AP(T f ) does not depend on f .
Notation. We sometimes refer to an abstract state sˆ ∈ Sˆ as the formula ∧sˆ(bp)=1 bp ∧∧
sˆ(bp)=0
¬bp. For a formula ψ ∈ LP , we denote by ψ(B) the result of substituting each
p ∈ P in ψ by the corresponding Boolean variable bp. For the opposite direction, given
a formula ψ over B, we denote by ψ(P) the formula in LP resulting from substituting
each bp ∈ B in ψ by p. Therefore, ψ(P) is a symbolic representation of γ(ψ).
Every set defined by a formulaψ ∈ LP is precisely represented byψ(B) in the sense
that γ(ψ(B)) is equal to the set of states defined by ψ, i.e., ψ(B) is a precise abstraction
of ψ. For simplicity, we assume that the termination conditions as well as the pre/post
specification can be expressed precisely using the abstraction, in the following sense:
Definition 7. P is adequate for T and (pre, post) if there exist ϕpre, ϕpost, ϕF i ∈ LP
such that ϕpre ≡ pre, ϕpost ≡ post and ϕF i ≡ F i (for every copy i ∈ {1..k}).
The following lemma provides the foundation for our algorithm:
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Lemma 4. Let T be a transition system, (pre, post) a k safety property, and P a finite
set of predicates adequate for T and (pre, post). For a self composition function f
defined via conditions {CM}M in LP , there exists an inductive invariant Inv in LP
such that (f, Inv) is a composition-invariant pair for T and (pre, post) if and only if
the following three conditions hold:
S1 All reachable states of AP(T f ) from ϕpre(B) satisfy (
∧k
i=1 ϕF i(B))→ ϕpost(B),
S2 All reachable states of AP(T f ) from ϕpre(B) satisfy
∨
M CM (B), and
S3 For every ∅ 6=M ⊆ {1..k}, CM (B) ∧ (
∨k
j=1 ¬ϕF j (B))⇒
∨
j∈M ¬ϕF j (B).
Furthermore, if the conditions hold, then the symbolic representation of the set of ab-
stract states of AP(T f ) reachable from ϕpre(B) is a formula Inv over B such that
(f, Inv(P)) is a composition-invariant pair for T and (pre, post).
Proof. The proof relies on the following statement, denoted by (∗): for a formula ϕ
in LP and an abstract state sˆ, for every s‖ ∈ γ(sˆ) it holds that s‖ |= ϕ ⇔ sˆ |=
ϕ(B) (which follows by induction on the structure of a formula in LP , relying on the
definition of γ(sˆ)). In particular, this implies that for a formula ψ over B, it holds that
s‖ |= ψ(P)⇔ sˆ |= ψ whenever s‖ ∈ γ(sˆ).
(⇒) Let T , (pre, post) and P be as described, and let (f, Inv ) be a composition-
invariant pair for T and (pre, post) in LP . We first show that every (abstract) state that
is reachable from ϕpre(B) in AP(T f ) satisfies Inv(B). Let sˆ be such a reachable state.
Then there exists an abstract trace sˆ1, . . . , sˆm such that sˆ1 |= ϕpre(B), sˆm = sˆ and
(sˆi, sˆi+1) ∈ Rˆ for every 1 ≤ i < m. Consider a concrete state s‖1 of T f such that
s‖1 ∈ γ(sˆ1), then sˆ1 |= ϕpre(B) and from (∗) we get s‖1 |= ϕpre. From the definition
of a composition-invariant pair (Definition 4) we get that s‖1 |= Inv (initiation). Since
Inv is inLP we get from (∗) that also sˆ1 |= Inv(B). For sˆ2, the next state in the abstract
trace, it also holds that sˆ2 |= Inv(B): since (sˆ1, sˆ2) ∈ Rˆ, we know that there exist some
s‖a ∈ γ(sˆ1) and s‖b ∈ γ(sˆ2) such that (s‖a, s‖b) ∈ Rf , using (∗) we get that s‖a |=
Inv, the consecution of Inv implies s‖b |= Inv and from (∗) we get sˆ2 |= Inv(B).
By induction over the length of the abstract trace we get that sˆ |= Inv(B). We now
turn to show that conditions S1–S3 hold. First, the safety of Inv for T f together with
adequacy of P and (∗) imply that Inv(B) ⇒ ((∧kj=1 F j(B)) → post(B)), and since
all the reachable states of AP(T f ) satisfy Inv(B), S1 follows. Similarly, the covering
requirement of f together with the property that CM is in LP for every M and together
with (∗) imply S2. Finally, S3 is implied directly from the fairness of f (Definition 4).
(⇐) Assume that for T , (pre, post), P and some composition function f as de-
scribed, conditions S1–S3 hold. Condition S1 ensures that AP(T f ) satisfies the safety
property (ϕpre(B), ϕpost(B)), when we augment AP(T f ) with a set of terminal states
given by the formula
∧k
i=1 ϕF i(B). Hence, there exists an inductive invariant Inv over
B for AP(T f ) and (ϕpre(B), ϕpost(B)). Furthermore, condition S2 ensures that there
exists such Inv for which Inv ⇒ ∨M CM (B) (for example, such Inv may be obtained
by conjoining the inductive invariant ensured by S1 with another inductive invariant
that establishes S2). To conclude the proof we show that (f, Inv(P)) is a composition-
invariant pair for T and (pre, post), as defined in Definition 4. First, initiation and
safety of Inv with respect to AP(T f ) and (ϕpre(B), ϕpost(B)), imply initiation and
safety (respectively) of Inv(P) with respect to T and (ϕpre, ϕpost) due to (∗) and ad-
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equacy of P . As for consecution of Inv(P): for a pair of states s‖1, s‖2 in T f such
that (s‖1, s‖2) ∈ Rf , if s‖1 ∈ γ(sˆ1) and s‖2 ∈ γ(sˆ2), then (sˆ1, sˆ2) ∈ Rˆ. Therefore,
if s‖1 |= Inv(P) then sˆ1 |= Inv (according to (∗)), and from consecution of Inv in
AP(T f ) also sˆ2 |= Inv , and from (∗) we get s‖2 |= Inv(P) and conclude the conse-
cution of Inv(P) in T f . Similarly, for covering of f : recall that Inv ⇒ ∨M CM (B),
hence by (∗), Inv(P) ⇒ ∨M CM , i.e., f covers the states satisfying Inv(P). Finally,
the fairness of f follows from S3. uunionsq
Algorithm 1 starts from the lock-step self composition function (Line 1), which is
fair7, and constructs the next candidate f such that condition S3 in Lemma 4 always
holds (see discussion of Modify_SC). Thus, condition S3 need not be checked explic-
itly.
Algorithm 1 checks whether conditions S1 and S2 hold for a given candidate com-
position function f by calling Abs_Reach (Line 3) – both checks are performed via a
(non-)reachability check inAP(T f ), checking whether a state violating (
∧k
i=1 ϕF i(B))→
ϕpost(B) or
∨
M CM (B) is reachable from ϕpre(B). Algorithm 1 maintains the abstract
states that are not in
∨
M CM (B) by the formula Unreach defined over B, which is
initialized to false (as the lock-step composition function is defined for every state)
and is updated in each iteration of Algorithm 1 to include the abstract states violating∨
M CM (B). If no abstract state violating S1 or S2 is reachable, i.e., the conditions hold,
then Abs_Reach returns the (potentially overapproximated) set of reachable abstract
states, represented by a formula Inv over B. In this case, by Lemma 4, (f, Inv(P))
is a composition-invariant pair (Line 4). Otherwise, an abstract counterexample trace
is obtained. (We can of course apply bounded model checking to check if the coun-
terexample is real; we omit this check as our focus is on the case where the system is
safe.)
Remark 3. In practice, we do not construct AP(T f ) explicitly. Instead, we use the im-
plicit predicate abstraction approach [6].
Eliminating self composition candidates based on abstract counterexamples. An
abstract counterexample to conditions S1 or S2 indicates that the candidate composition
function f has no corresponding Inv . Violation of S1 can only be resolved by changing
f such that the abstract trace is no longer feasible. Violation of S2 may, in principle, also
be resolved by extending the definition of f such that it is defined for all the abstract
states in the counterexample trace.
However, to prevent the need to explore both options, our algorithm maintains the
following invariant for every candidate self composition function f that it constructs:
Claim. Every abstract state that is not in
∨
M CM (B) is not reachable w.r.t. the abstract
composed program of any composition function that is part of a composition-invariant
pair for T and (pre, post).
7 Any fair self composition can be chosen as the initial one; we chose lock-step since it is a good
starting point in many applications.
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This property clearly holds for the lock-step composition function, which the algorithm
starts with, since for this composition,
∨
M CM (B) ≡ true. As we explain in Corol-
lary 2, it continues to hold throughout the algorithm.
As a result of this property, whenever a candidate composition function f does not
satisfy condition S1 or S2, it is never the case that
∨
M CM (B) needs to be extended
to allow the abstract states in cex to be reachable. Instead, the abstract counterexample
obtained in violation of the conditions needs to be eliminated by modifying f .
Let cex = sˆ1, . . . , sˆm+1 be an abstract counterexample of AP(T f ) such that sˆ1 |=
ϕpre(B) and sˆm+1 |= (
∧k
i=1 ϕF i(B)) ∧ ¬ϕpost(B) (violating S1) or sˆm+1 |= Unreach
(violating S2). Any self composition f ′ that agrees with f on the states in γ(sˆi) for every
sˆi that appears in cex has the same transitions in Rf and, hence, the same transitions
in Rˆ. It, therefore, exhibits the same abstract counterexample in AP(T f
′
). Hence, it
violates S1 or S2 and is not part of any composition-invariant pair.
Notation. Recall that f is defined via conditions CM ∈ LP . This ensures that for every
abstract state sˆ, f is defined in the same way for all the states in γ(sˆ). We denote the
value of f on the states in γ(sˆ) by f(sˆ) (in particular, f(sˆ) may be undefined). We get
that f(sˆ) =M if and only if sˆ |= CM (B).
Using this notation, to eliminate the abstract counterexample cex , one needs to elimi-
nate at least one of the transitions in cex by changing the definition of f(sˆi) for some
1 ≤ i ≤ m. For a new candidate function f ′ this may be encoded by the disjunctive
constraint
∨m
i=1 f
′(sˆi) 6= f(sˆi). However, we observe that a stronger requirement may
be derived from cex based on the following lemma:
Lemma 5. Let f be a self composition function and cex = sˆ1, . . . , sˆm+1 a coun-
terexample trace in AP(T f ) such that sˆ1 |= ϕpre(B) but sˆm+1 |= (
∧k
i=1 ϕF i(B)) ∧
¬ϕpost(B) or sˆm+1 |= Unreach. Then for any self composition function f ′ such that
f ′(sˆm) = f(sˆm), if sˆm is reachable in AP(T f
′
) from ϕpre(B), then a counterexample
trace to S1 or S2 exists.
Proof. Suppose that sˆm is reachable in AP(T f
′
) from ϕpre(B). Then there exists a
trace sˆ′1, . . . , sˆ
′
m in AP(T
f ′) such that sˆ′1 |= ϕpre(B) and sˆ′m = sˆm. Since f ′(sˆm) =
f(sˆm), the outgoing transitions of sˆm are the same in both AP(T f ) and AP(T f
′
). In
particular, the transition (sˆm, sˆm+1) from AP(T f ) also exists in AP(T f
′
). Therefore,
cex ′ = sˆ′1, . . . , sˆ
′
m, sˆm+1 is a trace to sˆm+1 in AP(T
f ′). If sˆm+1 |= (
∧k
i=1 ϕF i(B)) ∧
¬ϕpost(B), then cex ′ is a counterexample to S1 in AP(T f ′) as well. Consider the case
where sˆm+1 |= Unreach. By the construction of Unreach, this indicates that sˆm+1 has
an outgoing abstract trace that leads to violation of S1 or S2 with every non-starving
self composition function, and in particular in AP(T f
′
). uunionsq
Corollary 1. If there exists a composition-invariant pair (f ′, Inv ′), then there is also
one where f ′(sˆm) 6= f(sˆm).
Proof. If f ′(sˆm) = f(sˆm), then by Lemma 5, sˆm is necessarily unreachable inAP(T f
′
)
from ϕpre(B). Therefore, if we change f ′(sˆm), all the requirements of Lemma 4 will
still hold. If no alternative value that admits the fairness requirement exists, then f ′(sˆm)
can remain undefined. uunionsq
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Therefore, we require that in the next self composition candidates the abstract state
sˆm must not be mapped to its current value in f , i.e., f ′(sˆm) 6=M , where f(sˆm) =M 8.
Algorithm 1 accumulates these constraints in the set E (Line 6). Formally, the con-
straint (sˆ,M) ∈ E asserts thatC ′M must imply ¬(
∧
sˆ(bp)=1
p∧∧sˆ(bp)=0 ¬p), and hence
f ′(sˆ) 6=M .
Identifying abstract states that must be unreachable. A new candidate self compo-
sition is constructed such that it satisfies all the constraints in E (thus ensuring that no
abstract counterexample will re-appear). In the construction, we make sure to satisfy S3
(fairness). Therefore, for every abstract state sˆ, we choose a value f ′(sˆ) that satisfies the
constraints in E and is non-starving: a value M is starving for sˆ if sˆ |= ∨kj=1 ¬ϕF j (B)
but sˆ 6|= ∨j∈M ¬ϕF j (B), i.e., some of the copies have not terminated in sˆ but none of
the non-terminating copies is scheduled. (Due to adequacy, a value M is starving for sˆ
if and only if it is starving for every s‖ ∈ γ(sˆ).)
If for some abstract state sˆ, all the non-starving values have already been excluded
(i.e., (sˆ,M) ∈ E for every non-starving M ), we conclude that there is no f ′ such that
sˆ is reachable in AP(T f
′
) and f ′ is part of a composition-invariant pair:
Lemma 6. Let sˆ ∈ Sˆ be an abstract state such that for every ∅ 6= M ⊆ {1..k} either
M is starving for sˆ or (sˆ,M) ∈ E. Then, for every f ′ that satisfies S3, if AP(T f ′)
satisfies S1 and S2, then sˆ is unreachable in AP(T f
′
).
Proof. If f ′ satisfies S3 andAP(T f
′
) satisfies S1 and S2, then according to Lemma 4 f ′
is a part of some composition-invariant pair (f ′, Inv) for T . Furthermore, as shown in
the proof of Lemma 4, every (abstract) state that is reachable from ϕpre(B) in AP(T f ′)
satisfies Inv(B). Assume to the contrary that sˆ is reachable in AP(T f ′). Then sˆ |=
Inv(B). According to Definition 4, f ′ must be defined for sˆ, thus f ′(sˆ) =M ′ for some
∅ 6=M ′ ⊆ {1 . . . k}. Since f ′ is fair (satisfies S3) it must be the case that (sˆ,M ′) ∈ E.
According to the algorithm, at some iteration there was a composition f ′′ with f ′′(sˆ) =
M ′ that caused adding (sˆ,M ′) to E, i.e., there was a counterexample to S1 or S2
in AP(T f
′′
) in the form of a trace to sˆ. Then Lemma 5 implies that there is also a
counterexample to S1 or S2 inAP(T f
′
) because f ′(sˆ) = f ′′(sˆ) =M ′. This contradicts
the assumption that AP(T f
′
) satisfies S1 and S2. uunionsq
Corollary 2. If there exists a composition-invariant pair (f ′, Inv ′), then sˆ is unreach-
able in AP(T f
′
).
This is because no matter how the self composition function f ′ would be defined, sˆ is
guaranteed to have an outgoing abstract counterexample trace in AP(T f
′
).
We, therefore, turn f ′(sˆ) to be undefined. As a result, condition S2 of Lemma 4
requires that sˆ will be unreachable in AP(T f
′
). In Algorithm 1, this is enforced by
adding sˆ to Unreach (Line 8).
Every abstract state sˆ that is added to Unreach is a strengthening of the safety prop-
erty by an additional constraint that needs to be obeyed in any composition-invariant
8 If the conditions {CM}M defining f may overlap, we consider the condition CM by which
the transition from sˆm to sˆm+1 was defined.
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pair, where obtaining a composition-invariant pair is the target of the algorithm. This
makes our algorithm property directed.
If an abstract state that satisfies ϕpre(B) is added to Unreach, then Algorithm 1
determines that no solution exists (Line 9). Otherwise, it generates a new constraint for
E based on the abstract state preceding sˆ in the abstract counterexample (Line 12).
Constructing the next candidate self composition function. Given the set of con-
straints in E and the formula Unreach, Modify_SC (Line 13) generates the next can-
didate composition function by (i) taking a constraint (sˆ,M) such that sˆ 6|= Unreach
(typically the one that was added last), (ii) selecting a non-starving value Mnew for sˆ
(such a value must exist, otherwise sˆ would have been added to Unreach), and (iii) up-
dating the conditions defining f ′ as follows:
C ′M = CM ∧ ¬sˆ(P) C ′Mnew = (CMnew ∨ sˆ(P))
The conditions of other values remain as before. This definition is facilitated by the fact
that the same set of predicates is used both for defining f ′ and for defining the abstract
states sˆ ∈ Sˆ (by which Inv is obtained). Note that in practice we do not explicitly
turn f ′ to be undefined for γ(Unreach). However, these definitions are ignored. The
definition ensures that f ′ is non-starving (satisfying condition S3) and that no two con-
ditions C ′M1 6= C ′M2 overlap. While the latter is not required, it also does not restrict
the generality of the approach (since the language we consider is closed under Boolean
operations).
Theorem 2. Let T be a transition system, (pre, post) a k-safety property and P a set of
predicates over V‖k. If Algorithm 1 returns “ no solution” then there is no composition-
invariant pair for T and (pre, post) in LP . Otherwise, (f, Inv(P)) returned by Algo-
rithm 1 is a composition-invariant pair in LP , and thus T |=k (pre, post).
Proof. Algorithm 1 returns “ no solution” when Unreach ∧ ϕpre(B) is satisfiable. This
means that there is an abstract state sˆ that satisfies ϕpre(B) but also satisfies Unreach.
By the construction of Unreach, this means that sˆ must be unreachable from ϕpre(B) in
any AP(T f
′
) such that (f ′, Inv ′) a composition-invariant pair in LP (see Corollary 2).
Hence, no such (f ′, Inv ′) exists. Conversely, Algorithm 1 returns (f, Inv(P)) when all
the conditions listed in Lemma 4 are met, thus (f, Inv(P)) is a composition-invariant
pair. uunionsq
Complexity. Each iteration of Algorithm 1 adds at least one constraint to E, excluding
a potential value for f over some abstract state sˆ. An excluded values is never re-used.
Hence, the number of iterations is at most the number of abstract states, 2|P|, multiplied
by the number of potential values for each abstract state, n = 2k. Altogether, the num-
ber of iterations is at most O(2|P| · 2k). Each iteration makes one call to Abs_Reach
which checks reachability via predicate abstraction, hence, assuming that satisfiability
checks in the original logic are at most exponential, its complexity is 2O(|P|). Therefore,
the overall complexity of the algorithm is 2O(|P|)+k. Typically, k is a small constant,
hence the complexity is dominated by 2O(|P|).
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Program PDSC SYNONYM
Time(s) Iteations
DoubleSquareNI 7 33 fail
HalfSquareNI 3.4 28 fail
ArrayIntMod 58.2 168 fail
SquaresSum 2.8 4 fail
ArrayInsert 19.5 102 fail
Table 1: Examples that require semantic
compositions
Fig. 2: Runtime comparison (in sec.):
PDSC (x-axis) and SYNONYM (y-axis).
5 Evaluation and Conclusion
Implementation. We implemented PDSC (Algorithm 1) in Python on top of Z3 [25].
Its input is a transition system encoded by Constrained Horn Clauses (CHC) in SMT2
format, a k-safety property and a set of predicates. The abstraction is implicitly encoded
using the approach of [6], and is parameterized by a composition function that is mod-
ified in each iteration. For reachability checks (Abs_Reach) we use SPACER [22],
which supports LRA and arrays. For the set of predicates used by PDSC, we imple-
mented an automatic procedure that mines these predicates from the CHC. Additional
predicates may be added manually.
Experiments. To evaluate PDSC, we compare it to SYNONYM [26], the current state of
the art in k-safety verification.
To show the effectiveness of PDSC, we consider examples that require a nontriv-
ial composition (these examples are detailed in Appendix A). We emphasize that the
motivation for these example is originated in real-life scenarios. For example, Figure 1
follows a pattern of constant-time execution. The results of these experiments are sum-
marized in Table 1. PDSC is able to find the right composition function and prove all
of the examples, while SYNONYM cannot verify any of them. We emphasize that for
these examples, lock-step composition is not sufficient. However, PDSC infers a com-
position that depends on the programs’ state (variable values), rather than just program
locations.
Next we consider Java programs from [26,29], which we manually converted to C,
and then converted to CHC using SEAHORN [19]. For all but 3 examples, only 2 types
of predicates, which we mined automatically, were sufficient for verification: (i) rela-
tional predicates derived from the pre- and post-conditions, and (ii) for simple loops that
have an index variable (e.g., for iterating over an array), an equality predicate between
the copies of the indices. These predicates were sufficient since we used a large-step en-
coding of the transition relation, hence the abstraction via predicates takes effect only
at cut-points. For the remaining 3 examples, we manually added 2–4 predicates. With
the exception of 1 example where a timeout of 10 seconds was reached, all examples
were solved with a lock-step composition function. Yet, we include them to show that
on examples with simple compositions PDSC performs similarly to SYNONYM. This
can be seen in Figure 2.
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Conclusion and Future Work. This work formulates the problem of inferring a self
composition function together with an inductive invariant for the composed program,
thus capturing the interplay between the self composition and the difficulty of verify-
ing the resulting composed program. To address this problem we present PDSC– an
algorithm for inferring a semantic self composition, directed at verifying the composed
program with a given language of predicates. We show that PDSC manages to find non-
trivial self compositions that are beyond reach of existing tools. In future work, we are
interested in further improving PDSC by extending it with additional (possibly lazy)
predicate discovery abilities. This has the potential to both improve performance and
verify properties over wider range of programs. Additionally, we consider exploring
further generalization techniques during the inference procedure.
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A Benchmarks Used in the Evaluation
In this section, we elaborate on the examples from Table 1.
A.1 DoubleSquareNI
pre(x1 == x2)
doubleSquare(bool h, int x){
int z, y=0;
if(h) { z = 2*x; }
else { z = x; }
while (z>0) {
z--;
y = y+x;
}
if(!h) { y = 2*y; }
return y;
}
post(y1 == y2)
predicates:
h1, h2, x1 > 0, y1 ≥ 0, y2 ≥ 0, z2 ≥ 0,
z2 ≥ 0, x1 = x2, y1 = y2, y1 = 2y2, y2 = 2y1,
z1 = z2, z1 = 2z2, z2 = 2z1, z1 = 2z2 − 1,
z2 = 2z1 − 1, y1 = 2y2 + x2, y2 = 2y1 + x1
composition =
if(((z0 > 0 & z2 > 0 | (z1 ≤ 0 & z2 ≤ 0))
&& (h1 & z1 == 2 ∗ z2)
&& !(h1 == h2 || (z1 == 0 & z2 == 0)))
|| (!(z1 > 0 & z2 > 0 | (z1 ≤ 0 & z2 ≤ 0))
& z2 ≤ 0 & z1 > 0))
step (1);
else if (((z1 > 0 & z2 > 0 | (z1 ≤ 0 & z2 ≤ 0))
&& !(h1 == h2 | (z1 == 0 & z2 == 0))
&& !(h1 & z1 == 2 ∗ z2) & (z2 == 2 ∗ z1))
|| !(z1 > 0 & z2 > 0 | (z1 ≤ 0 & z2 ≤ 0)))
step (2);
else
step(1,2);
Fig. 3: A program that computes 2x2; the computation depends on a secret bit h while
x is the low input.
Figure 3 depicts a non-interference problem (a 2-safety problem) where x is the low
input and h is the high input. Taint analysis methods cannot prove non-interference
for this program, and no proof exists when the product program presented in [14] is
applied (see Appendix B). However, using the language of predicates presented (also in
Figure 3), our algorithm infers a composition-invariant pair that proves non-interference
for the program.
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A.2 HalfSquareNI
pre(low1 == low2)
halfSquare(int h, int low){
assume(low > h > 0);
int i = 0, y = 0, v = 0
while (h > i) {
i++; y += y;
}
v = 1;
while (low > i) {
i++; y += y;
}
return y;
}
post(y1 == y2)
predicates:
h1 > 0, h2 > 0 , low1 > h1,
low2 > h2, i1 < h1 ,i2 < h2,
i1 < low1, i2 < low2, v1 = 1,
v2 = 1, y1 = y2, i1 = i2,
low1 = low2
composition =
if ((v1 == 0 && i1 ≥ h1)
& (i2 < h2 || v2 == 1))
step(1);
else if ((v2 6= 1 && i2 ≥ h2)
& (i1 < h1 || v1 == 1))
step(2);
else
step(1,2);
Fig. 4: A program that computes low
2
2 ; the computation is not continuous and depends
on a secret variable h.
In the program presented at Figure 4 we consider the non-interference property, with
pre-condition low1 = low2 (low input) and post-condition y1 = y2 (non-interference).
The high input h has no constraints as implied from the pre-condition. Intuitively, the
difficulty of proving non-interference for this program is the need to "skip" the state-
ment between the two loops in order to keep the outputs of the copies equal in every
composed state along the execution. The suggested composition aligns the computa-
tions such that they proceed simultaniously only when both are at either loops, which
makes i1 = i2 ∧ y1 = y2 true for every state of the self composed program.
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A.3 ArrayIntMod
pre(o11 == o22 && o21 == o12)
int compare(AInt o1, AInt o2){
if(o1.len != o2.len){
return 0;
}
boolean flag = (o1.get(0)>0);
int i, aentry, bentry,last1,last2;
i = 0;
while ((i < o1.len) && (i<o2.len)) {
aentry = o1.get(i);
bentry = o2.get(i);
if (aentry < bentry) {
return -1;
}
if (aentry > bentry) {
return 1;
}
i++;
if(flag && ((i < o1.len) && (i < o2.len))){
aentry = o1.get(i);
bentry = o2.get(i);
if (aentry < bentry) {
return -1;
}
if (aentry > bentry) {
return 1;
}
i++;
}
}
return 0;
}
}
post(sign(compare(o11,o21)) = -sign(compare(o12,o22))
predicates:
len11 = len21, len11 = len22,
o11 = o22, o21 = o12,
len11 = len22, len21 = len12,
ret1 = −ret2, i1 < len11,
i2 < len12, i1 = i2,
i1 = i2 − 1, i2 = i1 − 1,
o11[i1] = o21[i1],
o12[i2] = o22[i2],
o11[i1 + 1] = o21[i1 + 1],
o12[i2 + 1] = o22[i2 + 1]
composition =
if ((i2 = i1 + 1 && i2 < len2) || (i2 = i1 && i2 < len2 && o12[i2] = o22[i2] &&
o12[i2 + 1] 6= o22[i2 + 1] && flag2 && !flag1)
step(1);
else if ((i1 = i2 + 1 && i1 < len1) || (i1 = i2 && i1 < len1 && o11[i1] = o21[i1] &&
o11[i1 + 1] 6= o21[i1 + 1] && flag1 !flag2))
step(2);
else
step(1,2);
Fig. 5: Comparator example with potentially unbalanced loops.
The example in Figure 5 is a comparator based on a Java comparator from the evaluation
comparator programs. The comparator was modified to have loop that might perform
two steps in a single iteration. The 2-safety property to prove for the comparator is anti-
symmetry, i.e. the pre-condition is o11 = o22 ∧ o12 = o21 and the post-condition is
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sign(compare(o11, o21)) = −sign(compare(o12, o22)). The figure also describes a
composition that aligns the loops according to the value of flag. This yields a composed
program that has an invariant that proves the desired property in the predicates language
from Figure 5.
A.4 SquaresSum
pre(a1 < a2 && b2 < b1)
squaresSum(int a, int b){
assume(0 < a < b);
int c=0;
while (a<b) {c+=a*a; a++;}
return c;
}
post(c2 < c1)
predicates:
c1 > c2, c1 = c2, a1 < a2
a1 = a2, b1 > b2, a1 < b1
a2 < b2, b1 > 1, b2 > 1
composition =
if (a1 < a2)
step(1);
else
step(1,2);
Fig. 6: A program that computes
∑
a≤n<b
n2.
For the program described in Figure 6 we consider the monotonicity property - a 2-
safety property with pre-condition [a2, b2] ⊂ [a1, b1] and post-condition c2 < c1.
Considering a composition that aligns the computations to start together and run si-
multaniously, it is easy to see that c1 < c2 for unbounded number iterations. However,
in Figure 6 we see a composition that eases the task of finding a proof by scheduling
the copies such that c2 < c1 holds from the first iteration of copy 2 and to the end of
both computations.
A.5 ArrayInsert
The program with a detailed explanation of its proof using a composition-invariant pair
are presented in Section 1.
B Demonstrating the Interplay Between Self Composition and
Inductive Invariants
We illustrate the effect of the self composition function on the difficulty of verifying
the obtained composed program, as well as the need for a semantic self composition
function on the simple example depicted in Figure 3. The program receives as input
an integer x and a secret bit h, and outputs y = 2x2. The desired specification is that
the output does not depend on h, which is indeed the case. Formally, this is a 2-safety
property with pre-condition x1 = x2 and post-condition y1 = y2, requiring that in any
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two terminating executions that start with the same values for x, the final value of y is
the same.
As explained earlier, any fair self composition function can be soundly used to re-
duce the 2-safety problem to an ordinary safety problem. This is because the variables
of the two copies of the program are completely disjoint, making the states completely
independent. Therefore, the output of each copy does not depend on the actual inter-
leaving of the two copies. As a result, if some interleaving (a fair self composition
function) violates the postcondition, all of them will. That is, the actual interleaving
does not affect the soundness of the reduction to traditional safety. However, when we
turn to verifying the safety of the composed program by finding an inductive invariant
in a given language, the specific self composition function used plays a significant role.
For example, consider a composition that “synchronizes” the two copies in each control
structure (e.g. [14]). Such a composition runs the two copies of the loop in parallel until
one copy exits the loop, and then continues to run the other copy. The self composed
program obtained by this composition is displayed in Figure 7.
doubleSquare_sc(bool h1, bool h2, int x){
int z1, z2, y1 = 0; y2 = 0;
if(h1) {z1 = 2*x;} else {z1 = x;}
if(h2) {z2 = 2*x;} else {z2 = x;}
while (z1>0 || z2>0) {
if (z1>0) {z1--; y1 = y1+x;}
if (z2>0) {z2--; y2 = y2+x;}
}
if(!h1) {y1 = 2*y1;}
if(!h2) {y2 = 2*y2;}
return y1, y2;
}
Fig. 7: Self composition for the program depicted in Figure 3 based on [14].
We show that for this composition, there exists no inductive invariant in quantifier
free linear integer arithmetic (QFLIA) that is sufficient for establishing safety of the
composed program.
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Proof. If we examine the set R of the reachable states of the composed program at the
exit point we see that it includes (for every natural n):
(x, y1, z1, y2, z2) 7→ (n, 0, 2n, 0, n)
(n, n, 2n− 1, n, n− 1)
. . .
(n, kn, 2n− k, kn, n− k)
. . .
(n, n2, n, n2, 0)
(n, n2 + n, n− 1, n2, 0)
. . .
(n, n2 + kn, n− k, n2, 0)
. . .
(n, 2n2, 0, n2, 0)
(We omit the second copy of x since both copies are equal in all the reachable states –
a fact that is also expressible in QFLIA – and similarly, we omit h1 and h2.)
Clearly, an inductive invariant must be satisfied by all of these states, since all of
them are reachable. However, we show that any QFLIA formula that is satisfied by all
of these states is also satisfied by a state that reaches a bad state (i.e., a state where
y1 6= y2), thus if it is safe, it necessarily violates the consecution requirement, which
means it is not an inductive invariant.
Let ϕ = ϕ1 ∨ . . . ϕr be a QFLIA formula, written in DNF form, where each ϕi is
a cube (conjunction of literals). Define R1, . . . , Rr ⊆ R such that Ri = {s ∈ R | s |=
ϕi} includes all states in R that satisfy ϕi. We show that there exists i such that ϕi is
also satisfied by a state that reaches a bad state.
R includes infinitely many “points” of the form n, n2, n, n2, 0 where n is an even
number. Therefore, since there are finitely many Ri’s that together cover R, there ex-
ists i such that Ri also includes infinitely many such points. Take two such points
(n, n2, n, n2, 0) and (m,m2,m,m2, 0) inRi where n 6= m. Then (1/2(n+m), 1/2(n2+
m2), 1/2(n+m), 1/2(n2+m2), 0) is a state (all values are integers) in the convex hull
of Ri. In particular, it must satisfy ϕi (ϕi is a cube in LIA that is satisfied by all states
in Ri, hence it is also satisfied by all states in its convex hull).
However, when executing the while loop starting from the state x 7→ 1/2(n +
m), y1 7→ 1/2(n2 + m2), z1 7→ 1/2(n + m), y2 7→ 1/2(n2 + m2), z2 7→ 0, the
outcome is the state x 7→ 1/2(n + m), y1 7→ 1/2(n2 + m2) + 1/4(n + m)2, z1 7→
0, y2 7→ 1/2(n2 +m2), z2 7→ 0, where y1 6= y2, hence safety is violated.
This means that ϕ is not an inductive invariant strong enough to establish safety of
the composed program, in contradiction. uunionsq
In contrast, with the composition function inferred by PDSC (see Figure 3), the
composed program has an inductive invariant in QFLIA.
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